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Cyber Threats Impacting Critical
Infrastructures
Michał Choraś, Rafał Kozik, Adam Flizikowski, Witold Hołubowicz
and Rafał Renk
Abstract Nowadays it is important to note that security of critical infrastructures
and enterprises consists of two factors, those are cyber security and physical
security. It is important to emphasise that those factors cannot be considered sep-
arately and that the comprehensive cyber-physical approach is needed. In this paper
we analyse different methods, methodologies and tools suits that allows modelling
different cyber security aspects of critical infrastructures. Moreover, we provide an
overview of goals an challenges, an overview of case studies (which show an
increasing complexity of cyber physical systems), taxonomies of cyber threats, and
the analysis of ongoing actions trying to comprehend and address cyber aspects.
1 Introduction
The CPS abbreviation stands for Cyber-Physical Systems and it refers to systems
that have distributed natures, are comprised of physical elements that work in a
real-time and are capable of communicating with each other by means of com-
munication network (both wired and wireless, see Fig. 1). CPS integrate compu-
tational, communication and physical aspects in order to improve usability,
efﬁciency, reliability, etc. However, such combinations, introduce a wide spectrum
of risks related to cyber domain (e.g. privacy issues, cyber attacks).
The CPS are comprised of elements that allow for reading relevant information
about controlled physical process (e.g. sensor) and elements that allows for
influencing (via actuators) the behaviour of this process. The CPS are widely
adapted in many critical sectors including energy, water, and transportation as well
as in the area of smart houses, vehicles, etc.
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Currently, the CPS are on the direction to become an integral part of our lives,
embracing in the near future such aspects as healthcare, disaster recovery, engi-
neering, trafﬁc control, robotic surgery, sea and space exploration, defence and
military operations.
This paper is structured as follows: ﬁrstly, we analyse goals and challenges in
area of cyber security of critical infrastructures, presenting case study overview and
elaborating on the impact of the cyber domain on the real world. Next, we provide
short overview of the taxonomies used to model and to analyse the cyber threats.
Afterwards, we provide an general overview on how the cyber security life-cycle is
modelled in terms of crisis management and critical infrastructures protection.
Particularly, we focus on different approaches to cyber risk identiﬁcation and cyber
incidents handling. In the following section, we present different aspects of IT and
physical networks that can be modelled with the formal tools and methodologies.
The analysis of ongoing actions trying to comprehend and address the challenges of
cyber aspects of critical infrastructures as well as the conclusions are given
afterwards.
2 Goals and Challenges
Quantitative evaluation of cyber security is always a challenge in the area of
computer science. For the CPS, the integration of ICT technologies with physical
elements has introduced new threats. Currently, we may ﬁnd many examples of the
Fig. 1 Dependencies between complex systems comprising CPS
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attackers have been able to compromise complex systems by ﬁnding vulnerable
elements. In many cases those attacks have had direct impact on physical elements.
Therefore, there is an ongoing effort to embrace the cyber aspects of CPS with
comprehensive tools and methodologies that commonly leverage wide spectrum of
technical and non-technical means. The current challenges related to CPS can fall





Of course, such problems should be handled in the holistic manner, e.g. by the
THOR (Technical, Human, Regulatory, Organizational) approach and aspects as
proposed by recently ﬁnished European projects [1, 2].
As the cyber security of CPS systems imposes a signiﬁcant challenge, in this
section, we particularly focus on different aspects of the cyber domain. We start
with examples of case studies that in many cases reveal the complex nature of those
systems and huge amount of interconnections that span across different levels of
Critical Infrastructure management.
Afterwards, we provide examples of how the European Union addresses current
problems and the challenges in the H2020 work program.
2.1 Cyber World and Real Impact—Selected Case Studies
Due to the fact that the energy sector is quickly evolving and it is widely adapting
different ICT technologies, we are able to identify many high proﬁle cyber inci-
dents. One of the most important cyber attacks in history of Critical Infrastructures
happened in 2012 [3], when Iran authorities announced that computers controlling
one of its nuclear processing facilities had been infected with malicious software
called Stuxnet. It was the ﬁrst case in which industrial equipment was a target of
computer attack. Since that date, the cyber community has realised that cyber
weapon can be used “… to create physical destruction […] in someone else’s
critical infrastructure…” [4].
Also for the water sector, we are able to ﬁnd relevant cyber incidents, which
show a real and high impact of the cyber world on physical infrastructures.
Similarly as for Energy sector, the cyber components for both drinking water and
wastewater facilities include control systems known as Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Cyber attacks on such utilities may cause
cascading effect on a public health, economics, and nations as whole. An example
presented in [5] shows how the attacker can influence water treatment plants.
According to IBTimes [5], attackers inﬁltrated the water plant and were able to
change the level chemicals that were used to treat drinking water.
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Healthcare industry is also an important part of critical infrastructure. It is also
targeted by cyber criminals. As examples show [6, 7], cyber-attacks targeted at this
sector can slow down hospitals and expose patients to danger.
Also the ﬁnancial sector is struggling with cyber attack. According to [8] the
activity of cyber criminals increased by 41% in recent years. Recent example of
Bangladesh bank [9] show that attackers have effective tools and skills to inﬁltrate
bank institutions and to steal serious amounts of money.
According to the [10], also the growth of the Internet of Things and complexity
of industrial control systems will lead to more vulnerabilities in hardware systems.
Many companies dealing with cyber security [1] have identiﬁed serious vulnera-
bilities in automotive systems and home-automotive systems. This shows that not
only critical infrastructures but also citizens directly are currently impacted by the
attackers as the cyber domain embraces increasing number of our lives.
2.2 The Coordinated Cyber Attack—Ukrainian Case
On the 23rd December 2015, the Ukrainian power distribution operator
Prykarpattya Oblenergo was suffered attack on their ICT infrastructure performed
by the third party. In effect of this breach, operation of a number of power sub-
stations were interrupted and about 80 thousands of customers from Ivano-
Frankivsk region were suffered an outage for next three to six hours, according to
the ofﬁcial information published through the operator website. At the same time,
the operator informed publicity about other technical failure related to the operation
of the call centre infrastructure. This caused impossibility for the customers to
contact operator during the blackout and deepened the crisis.
The above described circumstances indicate that the energy operator faced the
well-coordinated attack, that can be decomposed into three elements: a malware
attack, a denial of service attack targeted at the call centre functionalities and the
opening of substation breakers to cause the outage.
Firstly, the attackers infected the main servers controlling the electricity distri-
bution process, they inﬁltrated in the victim’s network (possibly using a malware
backdoor) and issued a command to open breakers of various substations.
The goal of the cyber criminal was to enter the power grid system by infecting
the victim’s machines with malware software. They used macro script in Excel ﬁles
to drop the malware. The infected Excel spreadsheets have been distributed during a
spear-phishing campaign that targeted IT staff and system administrators working
for multiple companies responsible for distributing electricity throughout Ukraine.
After the power was cut off, DoS attacks were launched to limit the target’s
awareness of the consequences of the attack—error messages did not reach service
personnel what prevented from proper reaction on the crisis and delayed the
recovering of the infrastructure operation.
The Ukrainian blackout case can be seen as the one of the ﬁrst signiﬁcant and
publicly reported cyber attacks aimed at civil infrastructure and directly impacting
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civil population (e.g. in opposition to the Stuxnet, Iranian case, where industry/
military premises were infected). Ukrainian case shows that motivated attackers are
able to cause serious damages to the economy and public safety of countries.
In case of the Ukrainian grid, luckily at that time, the manual mechanical
reaction was possible. It would rather not be possible in case of the much modern
and automated energy grids in some other countries.
2.3 Hybrid Conflicts
The Ukrainian case (described in the previous subsection) gives the short glance at
the possible impacts of the successful cyber attack launched at the critical infras-
tructure such as energy grid. Unfortunately, due to the current geo-political situation
and the current market of hackers (state and non-state), there is a signiﬁcant threat
that a country or its critical infrastructure can be attacked by another country or
hackers organization working for another hostile country. It is worth to notice, that
nowadays most hackers work for organizations rather than on their own (it changed
signiﬁcantly since in the past there were more freelancers than hackers working for
organizations). In other words, cyber attacks might be a part of so called hybrid war
or hybrid conflict, where (at least at the ﬁrst stages) traditional military measures
(such as soldiers) are not used, but the focus is on other destabilizing aspects like
cyber attacks, cyber propaganda, influencing social media and electronic media etc.
If the worst scenarios become reality, the successful coordinated cyber attacks
launched at critical infrastructures such as banks (no possibility to draw money
from ATM), energy (no electricity), transport, media etc. could paralyze societies,
countries and create chaos.
Therefore, in order to avoid situation like in the Ukraine, the effective solutions
and techniques to protect cyber physical systems are needed. The created recom-
mendations and technologies should cover the wide spectrum of aspects, such as
technological, organizational, human and regulatory (similarly to the THOR
approach suggested by the new cyber roadmaps by projects like CAMINO,
COURAGE and CyberRoad) [2, 11].
3 Cyber Threats Taxonomies
An important part of CPS cyber threats modelling is the taxonomy of cyber threats.
To combat the cyber crime effectively, it is required to identify, deﬁne and classify
the problem. It is not a trivial task, and currently even the spelling of the related
words is not agreed, some use cybersecurity or cyber security or cyber-security.
Similarly with other words like cybercrime, cyberterrorism etc.
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A taxonomy is most often deﬁned as a classiﬁcation of terms and has close a
relationship with the use of ontology. The primary purpose of ontologies and
taxonomies is to use them as the basis for processing, communicating and reasoning
about the cyber-related aspects and threats.
Also as noted by Furnell [12], having a consistent classiﬁcation of cyber crime is
beneﬁcial for bodies and organisations interested in cyber counterterrorism. One of
the earliest cyber crime classiﬁcations was established by UK Audit Commission
and proposed in [13]. This categorisation identiﬁes different groups of cyber crime
activities, like: Fraud (for private gain of beneﬁts), Viruses, Theft (of data or
software), Use of unlicensed software, Hacking, Sabotage, Misuse of personal data,
Introducing pornographic material.
In Furnell [12] proposed classiﬁcation that is based on two major types of the
cyber crime, namely computer-assisted and computer-focused. The computer-
assisted cybercrimes are these which use computer as supporting tool and where the
target is not to be directly connected with the cyberspace (e.g. harassment). The
computer-focused category of crimes includes these incidents that are almost entirely
technical, associated with ICT systems and not (or weakly) connected to other
sectors.
Similar dichotomized categorisation (as by Furnell) has been proposed by
Gordon and Ford [14]. Authors divided cyber terrorism into two distinct classes,
namely: (i) Type I Cybercrime, which is mostly technological in nature, (ii) Type II
Cybercrime, which has a more pronounced human element.
Different classiﬁcation is proposed in [15]. It is mainly focused on subject of
criminal activity and deﬁnes following main categories, namely: against individual,
against property, against organization, against society.
In opposite Walden [16] has postulated that there are ﬁve possible schemas of
classiﬁcation that overlap but are different in their perspective. These are: technology-
based, motivation-based, outcome-based, communication-based and information-
based crimes.
According to [17] motivation-based classiﬁcation schema provides more holistic
perspective on the topic cybercrime. The proposed motivational model is composed
of ﬁve major components: people, motivation, perpetration technology, security
barrier and the target. The people in the model refer either to offenders or criminals.
When individuals are exposed to a certain type of the factors they may become
motivated to carry out particular behaviour and commit a crime. The motivation
component refers to certain factors like unemployment, low median income, pov-
erty, or social status that push the individual to carry out a cyber crime. The
perpetration technology refers to technology used as a tool to commit a crime, while
security barrier indicates components (ﬁrewalls, anti-virus software, etc.) that need
to be comprised in order for crime attempt to be successful. The last component of
the model indicated as Target refers to the people or organization that are being
targeted by a criminal.
One of the approaches intending to comprehend cyber security aspects of critical
infrastructures have been attempted by the European Union-sponsored project
named Vital Infrastructure Threats and Assurance (VITA) [18]. One of the
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outcomes of the project was a generic threat taxonomy for Critical Infrastructures
(CIs). It categorises such aspects as threat cause, human intent, threat, etc. It is
emphasised by authors [19] of the taxonomy that terror, sabotage or activism are
not threats but motivations.
In [20] authors adapted and extended the VITA threat taxonomy for Smart Grids.
While identifying threats authors have addressed both the information and infras-
tructure dimension. Authors particularly wanted to identify how Smart Grid hard-
ware may influence the resilience and reliability of energy grids.
Recently, the taxonomy of the cyber crime and cyber terrorismwas discussed in [1].
4 CIP Cyber-Physical Security Life-Cycle Models
A wide spectrum of services provided by intelligent critical infrastructures (e.g.
Smart Grids) heavily depend on Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) that are able to
monitor, share and manage information. On the other hand, an increasing number of
cyber attacks and security breaches are part of rapidly expanding cyber threat,
which in many cases has form of cyber terrorism.
The cyber-physical security can be analysed from classical crisis management
point of view. In fact, most of incident management processes in the cyber domain
follows the ITIL model that is depicted in Fig. 2. It focuses on incidents detection,
diagnosis (e.g. identiﬁcation of exploits that attacker exploited), repairmen (e.g.
elimination of the software vulnerability that attacker exploited), recovery and
restoration (e.g. to normal business operation status).
However, this type of model may not properly show the iterative nature of
continuous improvement that usually are implemented after the crisis as an element
of lessons learnt. Therefore, the model of cyber security life-cycle would be that one
which is intended to deﬁne how to prevent, detect, respond to and recover from
cyber crisis, and ﬁnally to avoid reoccurrence. Thus, we can deﬁne Cyber Attack
Timeline, illustrated in Fig. 3, which is constituted of the following three phases:
Fig. 2 Incident management according to ITIL standard [35]
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• A Pre-Crisis (Steady State) phase in which organization aims at providing all
services as usual while increasing the preparedness to an critical event. For this
phase it is important to have risk management process that will allow the
organization for risk anticipation and proactive response.
• A Crisis phase in which a threat has to be maintained and system recovered. It is
an emergency case in which it is necessary to change the approach so that
threats can be quickly removed and their effects mitigated.
• A Post Crisis phase during which the “lesson learned” as a result of the Crisis
phase needs to feedback the whole process in order to reduce its impact in the
future.
In this section, we further elaborate on different aspects related to cyber security
of CPS systems that is embraced into crisis management phases namely: preven-
tion, detection, containment, and post-incident.
4.1 Pre-crisis Phase
4.1.1 Prevention and Proactive Response
The cyber security prevention is an important aspect when it comes to
cyber-physical systems and its impact on critical infrastructures. It requires some
amount of the resources to be allocated, however, it is better than often costly
recovery (or in worst case no recovery at all). As the value and importance of
prevention is at least well acknowledged in the communities, it is still in many cases
perceived as product that can be purchased and deployed in an organisation. In fact,
the prevention is long-lasting and continuous process reaching far beyond technical
problems embracing organisational, regulatory, and human aspects.
Fig. 3 Cyber crisis
management cycle
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Particularly, the cyber attack prevention requires (within the organisation) well
established roles that will be responsible for containing the cyber attack and its
causes. This implies that an organisation should deﬁne detailed cyber incident
response plan that will describe how an incident should be reported, investigated
and responded (Fig. 4). Moreover, when the cyber incident involves personal
information, it implies various data privacy and security laws that may have dif-
ferent shape in different countries.
As mentioned in [21], it is very important for Critical Infrastructures operators to
identify the risks posed by the communication networks and existence of depen-
dencies with third party systems. This is even more important form wider per-
spective, because such risk anticipation can prevent the possibility of cascading
failures causing catastrophic system damages.
The risk management cycle is a comprehensive process (Fig. 2) that requires
organizations to:
• frame the risk (i.e., establish the context for risk-based decisions),
• assess the risk,
• respond to the risk once determined,
• monitor the risk.
Usually this requires effective communication and an iterative feedback loop,
that will facilitate continuous improvement in the risk-related activities.
As it is suggested by ENISA [22], a good practice for well-suited prevention
mechanisms is to subscribe to relevant information sources that would give
up-to-date overview of current cyber threats and incidents reported. ENISA also
stresses the importance of information sharing.
More local (service based) approach to risk modelling has been proposed by
OWASP [23]. The approach follows the idea of decomposition of complex system
to smaller components (see Fig. 5 Threat Risk Modelling proposed by OWASP). It
is important to stress the fact that all key players (e.g. security ofﬁcers, employees)




7 Cyber Threats Impacting Critical Infrastructures 147
need to understand the security objectives. Therefore, usually the complex system is
broken down into objectives such us: reputation, availability, ﬁnancial, etc. Other
security objectives may be enforced by the law (ﬁnancial or privacy laws), adapted
standards (e.g. ISO).
The key element of this risk assessment methodology is the possible threats
identiﬁcation. Microsoft has suggested two different approaches to identify those
threats. One is a threat graph (see Fig. 6), as shown in Fig. 2, and the other is a
structured list.
4.1.2 Threat Detection
The capability of early detection of cyber threats is a very important element for
good cyber crisis preparedness. Probably, one of the most classic way to categorise
the cyber attack detection technique is to assign them into one of the following
groups, namely: signature-based, anomaly-based or hybrid (Fig. 7).
Each of this class of algorithms has their drawbacks and advantages, and dif-
ferent approaches to identify attacks. Some of the methods have also different
Fig. 5 Threat risk modelling proposed by OWASP [23]
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methods for data aggregation (e.g. host-based or network-based) and trafﬁc prop-
erties description (e.g. packet-based analysis or aggregated connections flows). All
the above mentioned aspects are dissuaded in the consecutive subsections.
The Signature-based category of cyber attacks detection typically include
Intrusion Prevention and Detection Systems (IDS and IPS) which use predeﬁned set
of patters (or rules) in order to identify an attack. The patterns (or rules) are
typically matched against a content of a packet (e.g. TCP/UDP packet header or
payload). Commonly IPS and IDS are designed to increase the security level of a
computer network trough detection (in case of IDS) and detection and blocking (in
case of IPS) of network attacks.
Commonly the patterns an attack for IPS and IDS software are provided by
experts form a cyber community. Typically, for a deterministic attacks it is fairly
easy to develop patterns that will clearly identify given attack. It often happens
when given malicious software (e.g. worm) uses the same protocol to communicate
trough network with command and control centre or other instance of such soft-
ware. However, the problem of developing new signatures becomes more com-
plicated when it comes to a polymorphic worms or viruses. Such software
commonly modiﬁes and obfuscates its code (without changing the internal algo-
rithms) in order to be less predictive and easy to detect.
Fig. 6 Threats identiﬁcation [23]
Fig. 7 Attack detection
techniques classiﬁcation
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4.2 Crisis Phase
In this phase risk management is not important, because it gives priority to incident
management in order to solve crisis and mitigate threats by adopting proper
countermeasures. However, it is worth mentioning that the emergency and con-
tingency procedures adopted during a Crisis Phase are developed during the
Pre-Crisis phase. In other words, during the Crisis phase it is not only important to
have an overall situational awareness picture, but also to have a strategy to recover
form crisis in the most efﬁcient way possible. There are different models for cyber
incidents handling. For instance, ENISA deﬁnes (see Fig. 8) formal manner starting
from incident reporting, going through analysis and recovery, and concluding with
post-analysis followed by improvements proposal. This model of cyber crisis
response is widely adapted by Emergency Response Teams (CERTs). According to
deﬁnition provided by ENICS [24] CERTs are the key institutions that are obliged
to receive, inform and respond to cyber security incidents. At the same time, they
act as educational entities in order to raise the cyber-related awareness and provide
primary security service for government and citizens. Every single country that is
connected to the Internet should have capabilities to respond to cyber-related
security incidents. Nevertheless, not every country has such capabilities. One of the
Fig. 8 ENISA incident handling model [22]
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earliest CERT teams focused on critical infrastructures was the US ICS-CERT
(Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team) that was estab-
lished in 2009 [25]. This institution aims at reducing the impact of cyber attacks. In
order to achieve this goal ICS-CERT takes preventative actions such as vulnera-
bility monitoring and reporting (each year ICS-CERT releases annual reports in
order to spread the information about the security incidents).
However, before the actual incident handling will take place, usually the incident
is veriﬁed and pre-classiﬁed, in order to assess its signiﬁcance, severity and time
constrains required to resolve it. This activity is named triage and refers to situation
in which there are limited resources and the decision maker has to decide on the
priorities of actions relying on the severity of the particular cases.
An important thing, which is not directly reflected by the incident handling
model, is fact that CERTs also collaborate with other Computer Emergency
Response Teams that are part of international or private sector institutions. This
cooperation allows the CERTs to share the information about control
systems-related security incidents and mitigation measures.
4.3 Post-crisis Phase
The post crisis phase is the phase in which threat has been eliminated and system
has been repaired, thus allowing the restoration of provided services and return to
usual business activities.
As recent cyber incidents show, it is important for the Critical Infrastructure
operators to have employees that would be educated and skilled in cyber security
aspects. The post-crisis phase is important for an organisation to draw some con-
clusion after the crisis and use this time as an opportunity to increase the number of
cyber security professionals at various levels of skill and competence, as well as to
upgrade the competence levels of the already hired staff.
In fact, learning from previous experiences is a continuous process for the
organisation. According to the terminology adapted in [26] this problem can be
decomposed into:
• acquiring experience,
• gathering and analysing experience,
• applying experience.
Obviously, in order to address all of above mentioned aspects, it is necessary to
have resources allowing for relevant data gathering and analysis. In many cases,
dedicated tools facilitating the end-user with such functionalities are used.
Particularly, in the post-crisis phase it is necessary to collect the lessons learnt and
analyse the overall crisis scenario from wider perspective in order to identify root
cause of the crisis and procedural pitfalls that may have been identiﬁed.
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In particular, a new risk analysis must be performed in order to evaluate if the
previously deﬁned security controls are still effective and to estimate whether risk
levels have been changed.
5 Modelling Cyber Security Aspects
There are different approaches to model cyber security aspects. Depending on the







As for the Network modelling, one can use different network simulation tools (e.g.
NS3, NS2, OPNET, NetSim) to analyse selected impacts of cyber attacks on
modelled network. For instance, in [27] authors used NS2 simulator to predict the
impact of malware propagation, Denial of Service and Man In The Middle attacks
on SCADA systems. The authors measure the impact among others in terms of loss
of control, Quality of Service (QoS), and number of dropped packets.
Different tools suits allow the user to model different aspects of telecommuni-
cation network with a varying granularity using different modelling techniques. In
the NS3, the topology and the conﬁguration of the simulation are provided either in
*.py (python) or in *.cc (c/c++) ﬁles. Commonly, these ﬁles contain the following
information:
Fig. 9 Different approaches to model cyber aspects
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• Nodes deﬁnition (names, types, positions, etc.)
• Communication links deﬁnition (data rates and delays)
• Topology deﬁnition
• IP stack installation
• IP addresses assignment
• Routing deﬁnition
• Conﬁguration of the application layer.
In NS3 the term node is used to name an abstract device connected to a network
such as end-users hosts, end-systems, routers, switches, hubs etc. Since NS3 does
not focus on Internet technologies only, it is the responsibility of simulation creator
to deﬁne nodes properly by adding applications, protocols stack, etc. In NS3 the
concept of application is deﬁned as an element that runs the simulation. It is the basic
abstraction of a user program, which generates some network trafﬁc. The NS3 allows
the user to use additional tools to visualise simulation at a runtime (see PyViz in
Fig. 10) and to prototype the network topology with GUI-enabled software.
5.2 Cyber Risk Assessment
The goal of the tools and methods used for the modelling the cyber risk is similar to
the previous approach, however the approach is substantially different. For instance,
the aim of tools like Haruspex [28], is to evaluate the probability that an adversaries
can implement successful cyber attack against a system. Haruspex implements the
simulation as model comprising of threat agents and the attacks they convey. The
system is modelled as a set of components interacting through channels. As a ﬁnal
result, the tool collects relevant statistical data from the simulations.
Similar approach to probability-based risk evaluation is presented in [29]. The
authors have adapted an ontology to model the system, its key components and
interaction between them. Main concepts, which compose main classes of proposed
Fig. 10 Example of network
topology visualized with
PyViz (NS3)
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ontology (see Fig. 11) are Assets (anything that has value to the organization),
Vulnerabilities (include weaknesses of an asset or group of assets which can be
exploited by threats), Threats (potential cause of an unwanted incident which may
result in harm to a system or organization), Safeguards (practices, procedures or
mechanisms that reduce vulnerabilities).
As argued by the authors, the ontology-based data models allows for addressing
the complexity, diversity, and sparsity of dependencies. An example of instantiated
ontology classes is shown in Fig. 12.
Fig. 11 High-level overview
of key classes in the ontology
Fig. 12 Ontology-based data model describing elements and dependencies between elements
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The results of the analysis conveyed with this tool is an interactive security
report (see Fig. 13). It allows the operator to go through the list of identiﬁed threats
and get the detailed description accompanied with security counter measure that is
likely to eliminate (or decrease) given risk.
5.3 System Behaviour and Attacks Modelling
The underlying motivation for system and attack modelling is the evolvement of
tools and techniques in the area of artiﬁcial intelligence, data mining, and classi-
ﬁcation. Those techniques allow for automated data analysis, novelty and anomaly
detection without extensive understanding of the underlying data content. The
anomaly-based methods for a cyber attacks detection build a model that is intended
to describe normal and abnormal behaviour of network trafﬁc.
The approach to adopt these techniques is in many cases similar. Firstly, sensors
collecting relevant data are deployed across network. Typically, these data require
further processing in order to extract relevant information (average value of mea-
sured physical property or number of packet transmitted, see Fig. 14).
Commonly such methods uses two types of algorithms from machine learning
theory, namely unsupervised and supervised approach.
Fig. 13 Example of analysis conveyed by DAT tool [29]
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For unsupervised learning commonly clustering approaches are used that usually
adapt algorithms like k-means, fuzzy c-means, QT, and SVM. The clustered net-
work trafﬁc established using mentioned approaches commonly requires decision
whenever given cluster should be indicated as a malicious or not. Pure unsupervised
algorithms uses a majority rule telling that only the biggest clusters are considered
normal. That means that network events that happens frequently have no symptoms
of an attack. In practice, it is a human role to indicate which cluster should be
considered as the abnormal one.
The supervised machine learning techniques requires at least one phase of
learning in order to establish the model trafﬁc. The learning is typically off-line one
and is conducted on specially prepared (cleaned) trafﬁc traces. One of the exemplar
approaches to supervised machine learning for cyber attack detection use auto
regression stochastic process (AR). In literature there are also methods using
Kalman ﬁlters. Recently, more gaining in popularity are solutions adapting SVM,
neural networks, and ID3-established decision trees.
6 Ongoing Efforts
6.1 H2020 Work Program View on CPS Aspects
The research topics deﬁned for the security call in Horizon 2020 programme reflect
the need for securing Critical Infrastructures—both physically as well as in digital
Fig. 14 A conceptual overview of on-line analysis
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domain, preventing them from cyber-attacks. For example, the topic
CIP-01-2016-2017 entitled “Prevention, detection, response and mitigation of the
combination of physical and cyber threats to the critical infrastructure of Europe”
addresses aspects of cyber and physical security convergence to protect installations
of the critical infrastructure of Europe. The challenge related to such protection is
not only addressing separately physical threats to CI (such as bombing and other
terrorists acts and natural-born threats as seismic activities or floods) and cyber
threats, but establishment of security management paradigms that include the
combinations of both group of threats, analysis of their interconnections and cas-
cading effects resulting from cyber or physical damages. Also, it is expected that
research initiatives acting under this topic will pursuit solutions related to sharing
information with the public in the region of affected installations, and the protection
of rescue teams, security teams and monitoring teams. The main expected results of
the research in short- and medium-term perspectives include analysis of
physical/cyber detection technologies and risk scenarios in the context of a speciﬁc
critical infrastructure, analysis of physical-cyber vulnerabilities of a speciﬁc critical
infrastructure, development of tools, concepts, and technologies for combating both
physical and cyber threats to a speciﬁc critical infrastructure. These tools should be
innovative, integrated, and dedicated to prevent, detect, respond and mitigate
physical and cyber threats and enabling monitoring of the environment, commu-
nication with the inhabitants in the vicinity of the critical infrastructure. In
long-term perspective, achievement of convergence of safety and security stan-
dards, and the establishment of relevant certiﬁcation mechanisms are expected in
this area.
Another example of topic in which the importance cyber-physical security is
emphasized is DS-01-2016: “Assurance and Certiﬁcation for Trustworthy and
Secure ICT systems, services and components”. In particular, speciﬁc nature of
CPS systems (that smart meters are highly connected to) as evolving, complex and
dynamically changing environment makes critical security-related decisions very
challenging and demanding a technology-based support.
Moreover, topics from past security call (H2020 WP2014-15) also addressed
problems of cyber-physical security convergence. One of examples was
DRS-12-2015 topic, entitled “Critical Infrastructure smart grid protection and resi-
lience under smart meters threats”, under which physical safety (threat of undesired
physical access to smart meters) was examined alongside other cyber threats.
6.2 Security Standards for Critical Infrastructures
In this section we provide the short overview of wide spectrum of different stan-
dards that address the cyber (as well as physical) security aspects of critical
infrastructures.
The ISA99 committee addresses the cyber security of industrial automation and
control systems by its ISA/IEC-62443 series of standards. The scope of the ISA99
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standards is very broad, i.e. the committee does not limit application of its standards
to the speciﬁc type of plants, facilities or systems. Manufacturing and control sys-
tems to which the ISA/IEC-62443 can be applicable include hardware and software
systems such as DCS, PLC, SCADA, networked electronic sensing, monitoring and
diagnostic systems as well as associated interfaces used to provide control, security,
and continuity of industrial processes. In the ISA/IEC-62443 series of standards
physical security is not directly addressed, despite the fact that physical security
highly impacts the integrity of any control system environment [30].
The NERC (North American Electric Reliability Corporation) CIP plan is a set
of requirements designed to secure the assets required for operating North
America’s bulk electric system. This set includes 9 security standards and 45
requirements and addresses security of electric systems and the protection of the
critical cyber assets operating within these systems. Cyber security training, man-
agement and crisis recovery are also included. Physical security of Critical electric
systems is covered by the CIP-006-1: Physical Security of Critical Cyber Assets
sub-standard [31, 32].
The IEC 62210 technical report on “Data and Communications Security” can be
applied to supervision, control, metering and protection systems in electrical util-
ities. The report covers a broad range of security related aspects such as deﬁnitions,
prioritization of threats, consequence analysis, attacks, policies and “Common
Criteria” protection proﬁle. Communication protocols used within and between
systems, secure use of the systems and access to them are also discussed.
Consequence analysis was adopted in the report as the security methodology for
prioritization of assets and threats to the security of the some industrial protocols
e.g. TC 57 protocol used for power systems management and exchange of asso-
ciated information. However, as it is stated in the report, the document does not
include recommendations or criteria development related to physical security of
critical systems [33]. In addition, IEC 62351 is a series of technical speciﬁcations
covering aspects of information security for power system control operations.
Selected aspects that are discussed in IEC 62351 are authentication of data
exchange (digital signatures, certiﬁcates), security of TCP/IP (e.g. encryption),
networks and systems security management and key management.
Also the IEEE 1402 standard applies to the power distribution and critical energy
infrastructures protection, however in a contrary to above described IEC documents,
this standard addresses aspects of physical security, especially in a context of
unauthorized access to electric power substations. The document describes and
guides a variety of methods to prevent such substations from human intrusion [34].
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have described various cyber security aspects related to the
cyber-physical systems and critical infrastructures. We have described current
challenges related to the technical aspects as well as the European vision on that
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matters. As we currently observe, due to the evolution of Internet and the wide
adoption of the Internet of Things concept, we may expect that in the near future the
cyber security of cyber-physical systems will become of even higher importance.
As gradually increasing number of elements and aspects (smart devices, homes,
cars, etc.) of our lives becomes connected to the Internet, it gives new opportunities
and motivations for the cyber criminals to research and to exploit technological
vulnerabilities in order to gain economical proﬁts. Those attempts cannot be suc-
cessful with regards to critical infrastructures and homeland security.
Therefore new technological and organizational solutions are needed for cyber
physical systems protection. There are also many urgent questions and aspects to be
addressed by nations and companies, such as if the standards and guidelines for
cyber security should be obligatory and mandatory (which also involved controlling
organizations and possible penalties), or if those should rather be voluntary.
Moreover, the minimal security standards have to be deﬁned. Another difﬁculty is
to ﬁnd the right balance for the appropriate level of details of recommendations and
standards. Should those be rather general, universal and high level (for further
customization for each organization), or should those be as detailed as possible
mentioning particular technologies and solutions to be applied. At the nations level,
the decision should be also made who (which organizations) should issue such
standards and guidelines. Should those be sectorial organizations (e.g. for standards
for energy, healthcare, ﬁnancial sector etc.) or rather ministries covering wider
range of applications?
However, the most crucial aspects now for protecting critical infrastructures is
the awareness building. Without the understanding and awareness of all the actors
(private CI owners, governments, managers, employees at all levels etc.) our critical
infrastructures will be still endangered by the cyber and physical attacks.
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